The first construction of strongly secure quantum ramp secret sharing by Zhang and Matsumoto had an undesirable feature that the dimension of quantum shares must be larger than the number of shares. By using algebraic curves over finite fields, we propose a new construction in which the number of shares can become arbitrarily large for fixed dimension of shares.
ramp SS, a share set is said to be forbidden if it has no information about secret, while it is said to be intermediate if it is neither qualified nor forbidden [5, 14] .
The first quantum ramp SS was proposed by Ogawa et al. [9] , which made the share size L times smaller than its secret, where L is the number of qudits in the secret. In their study [9] , there were two drawbacks. Firstly, it does not control how information is leaked to a non-qualified set of shares, and there exists an undesirable case in which an intermediate set of shares can understand a qudit in the secret, as demonstrated in [15] . To exclude such a possibility, we introduced a notion of the strong security of quantum ramp SS, which ensures no intermediate set can understand a qudit in the secret (see [15] for its formal definition) and proposed an explicit construction with the strong security.
The second drawback of [9] as well as our previous proposal [15] is that the dimension of quantum shares must be larger than that of the number of participants. When the number of participants is large, handling quantum shares become more difficult, because handling large dimensional quantum systems are generally more difficult than smaller ones. Our previous proposal [15] solved the first drawback but did not the second. The purpose of this paper is to solve the first and the second drawbacks of [9] simultaneously.
We will proceed as follows: Firstly, we modify the strong security definition given in [15] in Section 2, because the previous definition in [15] required that all the qualified sets are of the same size, and also that all the forbidden sets are of the same size. Secondly, in Section 3, we carry over the classical strongly secure ramp SS [2, 7] using algebraic curves to the quantum setting, then we prove that the proposed quantum SS has the strong security. We also present sufficient conditions for its qualified, intermediate, and forbidden sets by using the technique in [6] . We conclude this paper in Section 4.
Extended Definition of the Strong Security
Let q be a prime power, G i (i = 1, . . . , L) and H j ( j = 1, . . . , n) be the q-dimensional complex linear spaces, where G i contains the i-th qudit of the quantum secret, while H j contains the j-th quantum share. L is the number of qudits in secret and n is the number of shares or participants. In this paper we consider the so-called pure state scheme [3, 4] , in which a pure state secret is converted to pure state shares. Encoding is an isometric complex linear map from
. . , n} is said to be qualified if the quantum secret is perfectly reconstructed from the aggregated shares in j∈J H j , forbidden if the aggregated shares in j∈J H j is always the same quantum state regardless of the quantum secret, and intermediate otherwise, as defined in [9] .
We introduce a new definition of the strong security, which does not require the qualified and the forbidden sets being the same size. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , L}, J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, I = {1, . . . , L} \ I, and J = {1, . . . , n} \ J. Define G I = i∈I G i , and G I = i∈I G i . The idea behind the following strong security with respect to I and J is that the share set J has no idea on what is a quantum state ρ I on the part G I of the quantum secret. To formally express this idea, the quantum state σ J of shares on j∈J H j is required to be independent of ρ I . On the other hand, σ J also depends on the quantum state on G I . When an illegitimate owner of the shares in J is guessing ρ I , she or he is assumed to have no prior knowledge on the part G I , which enables us to use the fully mixed state as the state on G I . By using the above ideas, we formally define our extended version of the strong security.
Definition 1
We retain notations from the above discussion. A quantum ramp secret sharing scheme is said to be strongly secure with respect to I and J if the quantum state σ J on the share set J is always the same state regardless of the quantum state ρ I ⊗ ρ I,mix of the whole quantum secret, where ρ I,mix is the fully mixed state on G I .
In our previous paper [15] , a (k, L, n) quantum ramp SS (in the sense of [9] ) was said to be strongly secure if all I and J with |I| + |J| ≤ k satisfy Definition 1, where k was the minimum size of share sets which can perfectly reconstruct the secret, and L, n had the same meaning as the present paper.
Explicit Construction of Strongly Secure Quantum Ramp SS
In the previous constructions [9, 15] of quantum ramp SS, shares are generated by using evaluations of a polynomial at pairwise distinct numbers in the finite field F q with q elements. Obviously q must be larger than n in those constructions. In the above constructions, the dimension of quantum shares is also q, and larger values of q usually make implementation difficult. The restriction q > n also exists in the classical SS based on evaluations of a polynomial [8, 10] . One of standard ways in classical SS to overcome the restriction q > n is to use points on an algebraic curve as done in [2] . We will propose an explicit strongly secure quantum ramp SS based on the idea in [2] .
It is well-known that an algebraic curve is mathematically equivalent to an algebraic function field of one variable [12] . So we will describe our proposal by using terminology of algebraic function fields, as done in [2] . We briefly review the algebraic function fields, see [12] for a formal exposition. The rational function field F q (x) over F q is the set of f (x)/g(x), where f (x) and g(x) are polynomials in x with their coefficients in F q . Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division in F q (x) are defined in the standard way. An algebraic function field F is an extension field of F q (x) such that the dimension of F as an F q (x)-linear space is finite. It is usually denoted as F/F q to indicate that it is defined by equations over F q .
Example 1 Let F be the field obtained by adding y to F 4 (x), where y is a root of the univariate polynomial y 2 + y = x 3 (x 3 is regarded as a coefficient). Then F is an algebraic function field of one variable, and denoted by F 4 (x, y). The process of creating F 4 (x, y) from F 4 (x) is the same in spirit as creating the field of complex numbers from that of real numbers by adding a root of z 2 = −1. Observe also that the equation y 2 + y = x 3 can also be seen as an algebraic curve. There are eight points R 1 , . . . , R 8 ∈ F 2 4 satisfying y 2 + y = x 3 . For example, (x, y) = (0, 1) satisfies y 2 +y = x 3 and can be R 1 . Those eight points can be used for evaluations in the SS proposed in [2] and also in our proposal described later. Note that usable points for evaluation increase from 4 to 8.
In the following we will use so-called F q -rational places. R 1 , . . . , R 8 are examples of F 4 -rational places in this function field. The solutions of the defining equation of F, e.g. y 2 + y = x 3 , are a subset of F q -rational places, provided that the curve defined by the equation is smooth. See [12] for formal definitions.
We return to the general description of our proposal. Let P 1 , . . . , P n , Q 1 , . . . , Q L be pairwise distinct F q -rational places of F/F q . A divisor of F/F q is a formal sum of (not necessarily F q -rational) places F/F q , e.g. 2R 1 − R 3 in Example 1. The support of a divisor G is the set of places whose coefficient in G is nonzero. For example, the support of 2R 1 −R 3 is the set {R 1 , R 3 }. Let G be a divisor whose support contains none of P 1 , . . . , P n , Q 1 , . . . , Q L . For any divisor G, there is a finite-dimensional F q -linear space L(G), see [12] 
Thus, an element h ∈ L(uQ) is a polynomial in which every term is a multiple of a monomial in (1) . We can obtain a value in F 4 by substituting x, y in h by components in R i (for example R 1 = (0, 1)) defined in Example 1. The obtained value is called the evaluation of h at R i and denoted by h(R i ).
In our proposal as well as [2] , we also use another linear space
Now we are ready to describe our proposal. Since we assumed dim G i = dim H j = q for all i, j, we can assume their orthonormal basis to be {|a | a ∈ F q }. Then the basis of L i=1 G i can be written as {|s | s ∈ F L q }. To describe quantum ramp SS, it is sufficient to specify the quantum state of shares corresponding to a quantum secret |s ∈ L i=1 G i for every s ∈ F L q as done in [9, 15] . We assume that
The secret |s is encoded to
The mapping h ∈ L(G) to (h(Q 1 ), . . . , h(Q L )) is F q -linear and its kernel is L(G − Q 1 − · · · − Q L ) (see the end of Example 2). By (2) this mapping is surjective, and
, h(Q L )) = s, which justifies the normalization factor in (4).
On the other hand, (3) ensures that the mapping h ∈ L(G) to (h(P 1 ), . . . , h(P n )) is F q -linear and injective. This guarantees that terms appearing in the summation of (4) do not overlap for different s, s ′ ∈ F L q , which means that the encoded shares (4) for different s, s ′ are orthogonal to each other. From these discussions we see that (4) maps an orthonormal basis to a subset of an orthonormal basis, and that (4) defines a complex linear isometric embedding, from
Remark 1 One of the two classical ramp SS proposed by Chen et al. [2] is as follows:
is chosen uniformly randomly. Then the j-th share is computed as h(P j ). Its similarity to our proposal (4) should be obvious.
For its strong security, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The above quantum ramp SS is strongly secure with respect to I ⊂ {1, . . . , L} and J ⊂ {1, . . . , n} if
where g(F) denotes the genus of the algebraic function field F/F q , see [12] for its definition.
Its proof is technically complicated and heavily uses the theory of algebraic function field [12] , so we move it to Appendix A. For quantum ramp SS to be useful, a procedure for reconstructing the quantum secret and sufficient conditions for qualified and forbidden sets are indispensable. On the other hand, actually the above proposal is a special case of quantum ramp SS constructed from algebraic curves studied in [6] . By straightforward application of [6] , {1, . . . , n} ⊃ J is qualified if
and J is forbidden if
Note that (5) contains (7) as its special case |I| = 0. The reconstruction procedure in [6] can also be used for the proposal in this paper. The algebraic function field in Examples 1 and 2 has genus g(F) = 1. To make n larger with fixed q, we must find an algebraic function fields with many F q -rational places. It is well-known [12] that the number of F q -rational places is at most 1 + q + g(F)⌊2 √ q⌋. F/F 4 in Examples 1 and 2 reaches this upper bound, because the place Q in Example 2 is also F 4 -rational and F/F 4 in Examples 1 and 2 has nine F 4 -rational places. Requiring more F q -rational places generally makes g(F) larger, which makes inequalities (5), (6) and (7) weaker. For fixed q and n, it is desirable to use an algebraic function field with smaller g (F) . Search for such ones has been an active research area in pure mathematics for past 30 years, see [12] . In particular, it is known that for fixed q we can construct an algebraic function field with arbitrarily many F q -rational places.
Conclusion
In this paper we argued that the previously proposed strongly secure quantum ramp SS [15] becomes difficult in implementation when the number n of participants is large, because the dimension q of each quantum share must be > n. To overcome this drawback, we proposed new quantum ramp SS that allows arbitrarily large n for fixed q while retaining the strong security. The proposed construction is similar to the classical ramp SS proposed by Chen et al. [2] .
A Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we will prove a proposition covering a more general class of quantum ramp SS. We consider a quantum ramp SS constructed from a pair of linear codes C 2 C 1 ⊆ F n q with dim C 1 −dim C 2 = L, which was considered in [6] .
Encoding is done as follows: We will encode a quantum secret to n qudits in n j=1 H j by a complex linear isometric embedding. To specify such an embedding, it is enough to specify the image of each basis state |s ∈
Recall that by definition of f , f (s) is a subset of 
which is a vector with |I| components.
Then the quantum ramp SS constructed from C 1 C 2 is strongly secure with respect to I and J if and only if
dim P J∪{n+1,...,n+|I|} (C
Proof By reordering indices we may assume I = {1, . . . , |I|}. For
We have dim
In the definition of strong security, the quantum secret has the form
whose purification is
where |s I R is a state vector in the reference system for purification. The encoding procedure defined in this appendix transforms (13) to
|y .
The joint quantum state of shares and the reference system for purification can be regarded as encoded shares from the quantum secret
by using C ′ 1 /C ′ 2 and f ′ . Equations (11) and (12) is the necessary and sufficient condition [6] for J to be a forbidden set, which shows the theorem.
⊓ ⊔
We start our proof of Theorem 1. Hereafter we make a different assumption I = {1, . . . , |I|}. C ′ 1 and C ′ 2 in Proposition 1 become
Equation (5) ensures that
By [12] , (14) implies that the mapping L(G) ∋ h → (h (P j 1 ) , . . . , h(P j |J| ), h(Q i 1 ), . . . , h(Q i |I| )) ∈ P J (C ′
) is
F q -linear and bijective, where {i 1 , . . . , i |I| } = I and { j 1 , . . . , j |J| } = J. The above mapping also gives P J (C ′ 2 ) as its image of L(G − i∈I Q i ). Equation (2) implies
which in turn implies (12) by the above bijection between L(G) and P J (C ′ 1 ). On the other hand, (5) also ensures that
By [12] , (15) implies that the mapping L(G − i∈I Q i ) ∋ h → (h(P j ′ 1 ), . . . , h(P j ′ |J| )) ∈ F |J| q is F q -linear and surjective, where { j ′ 1 , . . . , j ′ |J| } = J. On the other hand, the image of the above mapping is P J (C ′ 2 ), which means that P J (C ′ 2 ) = F |J| q = P J (C ′ 1 ), which in turn means that (11) holds. Since we have confirmed (11) and (12) , the proof of Theorem 1 is completed by using Proposition 1.
⊓ ⊔
